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Risk Allocation across the
Enterprise: Evidence from the
Insurance Industry
Michael K. McShane1, Tao Zhang2, and Larry A. Cox3

Abstract: Financial researchers initially regarded hedging activities as a means to
reduce total firm risk, which often is defined in terms of cash flow volatility. More
recently, researchers have focused on the strategic allocation of risk. Direct tests of risk
allocation have been problematic, however, because hedging data are rarely available
and, when available, are specific only to a single operation of the firm, such as bank
lending. In this study, we exploit unique data from the insurance industry that allows
us to observe hedging proxies for both investment and insurance underwriting risks
and test the risk allocation hypothesis developed in the finance literature. We also
conduct separate examinations of life‐health and property‐casualty insurers, which
reveal differences in the risks and hedging activities of these two types of insurers.
[Key words: risk allocation, hedging, enterprise risk management.]

INTRODUCTION
uring the past two decades, financial researchers have begun to
explore the economic rationale for and methods of managing risk
across the enterprise. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) develop a model
showing that in imperfect capital markets, risk management can enhance
the firm’s value and decrease firm‐wide risk by reducing cash flow volatil‐
ity. Froot and Stein (1998) subsequently build an integrated framework to
incorporate risk management, capital structure, and investment policy
decisions to reduce firm‐wide risk in the banking industry. Stulz (1996)
introduces an alternative view, contending that managers should bear,
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rather than hedge, those financial risks in which they have comparative
advantages.
In line with Stulz’s contention, Schrand and Unal (1998) suggest that
firm managers should follow a risk allocation strategy in which they hedge
homogeneous risks, i.e., those in which they have no informational advan‐
tages, so that they can devote more capital to core‐business activities in
which they have special expertise. Since Schrand and Unal, research on
managing multiple risks simultaneously has been scant, with Mun and
Morgan (2003) and Lookman (2009) providing notable exceptions.
Schrand and Unal (1998) examine thrift institutions converting from
mutual to stock organizational forms, reasoning that such firms will have
greater opportunities to expand capital and exploit core‐business growth
opportunities. They expect that managers of recently demutualized thrifts
generally will increase total risk as they simultaneously hedge homoge‐
neous risk and expand core‐business risk. Because Schrand and Unal (1998)
cannot directly observe the hedging activities of thrifts, they develop
indirect risk proxies for homogeneous (interest rate) and core‐business
(credit) risk. Applying regression to test for differences before and after
stock conversions, they conclude that their results are consistent with the
use of risk allocation strategies.
We expand upon the work of Schrand and Unal (1998) in two ways.
First, we are able to directly test for risk allocation via hedging proxies for
the two primary operations of insurers—underwriting and investment. In
contrast, Schrand and Unal (1998) test for allocation of financial risks only
within a single operation, i.e., lending activities.
Second, in contrast to Schrand and Unal, we do not have to make
strong assumptions about hedging activity, but can directly observe well‐
established proxies for hedging activities by insurers that are fully reported
to regulators in annual reports. For instance, insurers primarily use deriv‐
atives to hedge investment risk.4 Reinsurance is the primary means for
hedging underwriting risk (Doherty, 2000). The available data for insurers
4

One potential concern is that derivatives usage measures also can impound speculative
holdings (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand, 1997). Survey research (Hoyt, 1989; Santomero and
Babbel, 1997) suggests that insurance managers generally use derivatives for hedging pur‐
poses, however. Based upon their analysis of insurer financial data, Cummins, Phillips, and
Smith (2001) also conclude that the preponderance of derivatives transactions by insurers is
for hedging, rather than speculative, purposes. Raturi (2005) discusses hedging and specula‐
tive uses of derivatives by insurers and states that insurers mainly use derivatives for hedg‐
ing market, credit, and liquidity risks, but property‐liability insurers sometimes use covered
calls of their equity portfolio for income generation. He argues that non‐hedging, specula‐
tive use of derivatives is rare due to strict regulation by state insurance regulators.
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also allow us to incorporate multiple factors found by previous researchers
to be important in hedging decisions.
Applying Schrand and Unal’s taxonomy, we classify underwriting risk
as the core‐business risk of insurers while investment risk inherent in
insurers’ investment portfolios represents homogeneous risk. Because of
many years of data and experience in insurance underwriting, insurers
should have a comparative information advantage in this core‐business
operation, which allows them to take risks that are more likely to produce
positive economic rent.
In contrast, managers of insurers should have no information advan‐
tages in their investment operations compared to managers of other
financial institutions, assuming that investment markets are reasonably
efficient. Managers of all financial institutions can directly hedge invest‐
ment risk via derivatives. Only insurers must file detailed annual reports
on such activities with regulators, however.
Our evidence indicates that managers of property‐casualty (P‐C)
insurers that retain higher levels of underwriting risk because of relatively
low usage of reinsurance simultaneously carry lower investment risk levels
because of greater use of derivatives. Also for P‐C insurers, we do not find
a significant relation between cash flow volatility (total risk) and hedging
activity via derivatives or reinsurance. Our findings therefore provide
evidence that P‐C insurers hedge to strategically allocate risk across the
enterprise to take advantage of core‐business strengths rather than reduc‐
ing total risk.
For life‐health (L‐H) insurers, our results are not as clear cut. We find
evidence of risk allocation in only one of our specifications. We suggest that
this is not totally unexpected because many L‐H contracts, such as universal
life insurance, annuities, and guaranteed investment contracts, have a sub‐
stantial investment component. In such instances, underwriting risk is at
least partially akin to investment risk. Consequently, the incentives to hedge
investment risk in asset portfolios as a means of accepting additional
underwriting risk are not as great for L‐H insurers as for P‐C insurers.
In the next section, we review the research literature relevant to the
rationale for and implementation of risk management. We then discuss the
hedging of risk in the insurance industry and the factors affecting hedging
activity. The remaining sections contain our empirical research design,
results, and conclusions, respectively.

RATIONALES FOR HEDGING
A tenet of modern portfolio theory is that firms in perfect markets
should not hedge because investors can eliminate unsystematic risk
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through diversification. Market imperfections do exist, however, and
researchers have offered a variety of reasons to hedge, which we discuss
subsequently.

Financial Distress Costs
Hedging can decrease total risk by reducing the direct costs related to
financial distress and also indirect costs, such as reputational loss, that can
adversely affect relations with customers, employees, and suppliers (Smith
and Stulz, 1985). Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) provide empirical
evidence that managers of insurers use derivatives to reduce financial
distress costs.

Tax Liabilities
Hedging can reduce the variability of pre‐tax firm values and, conse‐
quently, expected tax liabilities under typically convex tax schedules (May‐
ers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Empirical evidence from both
nonfinancial and insurance firms supports the presence of such tax incen‐
tives (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Cummins, Phillips, and Smith,
1997, 2001). Alternatively, Graham and Rogers (2002) suggest that firm
managers can hedge to increase debt capacity, which allows them to
borrow more and decrease taxable income via larger interest deductions.

Capital Shocks and Underinvestment Costs
In the Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) model, if external funds cost
more than internal funds, perhaps because of the information asymmetries
suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984), firm managers may underinvest if
sufficient internal funds are not available.5 Hedging therefore can reduce
income volatility and preserve adequate internal funds to finance profit‐
able investments. Their model predicts that firms with relatively lower
liquidity positions, more volatile cash flows, and higher growth opportu‐
nities are more likely to hedge. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) analyze
currency derivatives hedging by firms and find evidence of reduction in
financial shocks.
Froot and Stein (1998) develop a model of hedging, capital structure,
and capital budgeting for financial institutions. They imply that any
5
Myers and Majluf (1984) specifically show that managers with informational advantages
over essentially passive shareholders and limited operating cash flows can rationally refuse
to issue stock to finance projects with positive net present values. Under such circum‐
stances, issuing stock can be interpreted as a “bad news” signal by investors, resulting in a
devaluation of the stock that exceeds the positive benefits of the new projects.
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efficiently tradable risk should be fully hedged to avoid financial shock.
Guay (1999) examines new derivatives users and provides evidence
suggesting that hedging reduces firm risk, measured in several ways,
including stock return volatility.
Building upon Stulz’s contention that managers should selectively
bear financial risks in which they comparative advantage, Schrand and
Unal (1998) analyze 134 demutualizing thrifts. They assume that demutu‐
alization provides thrift managers with greater opportunities to take risks
because of new access to capital markets and/or more incentives to accept
risk because of new stock‐based compensation schemes. Their tests pro‐
vide evidence that managers of demutualizing thrifts allocate risk by
hedging their homogeneous (interest‐rate) risk while simultaneously
accepting more core‐business (credit) risk. In doing so, total risk may not
be reduced. In fact, it can be increased.
Because of data limitations, Schrand and Unal (1998) can apply only
indirect proxies for homogeneous and core‐business risk and implement
a simple regression method to imply relations that are consistent with
the risk allocation hypothesis.6 The measurement problems they face are
challenging because even the most elemental hedging expenditures of
businesses generally are shielded from public view.
Since the Schrand and Unal (1998) study, research related to compar‐
ative advantage and risk allocation by firms has been limited. Naik and
Yadav (2003) find that UK bond dealers with higher order flow assume
more interest‐rate risk and hedge less, which is consistent with selective
hedging. Mun and Morgan (2003) find that banks can improve perfor‐
mance by hedging foreign exchange and interest rate risks simultaneously
rather than separately. Lookman (2009) provides evidence that banks with
an active derivatives trading operation have a comparative advantage in
bearing lending risk.

SPECIFIC FACTORS AFFECTING HEDGING ACTIVITIES
Researchers have separately explored various determinants of hedg‐
ing via derivatives and reinsurance. We next discuss the rationale and
empirical evidence pertaining to these factors.
6
Schrand and Unal (1998) specifically create risk proxies for homogeneous and core‐
business risk and assume that changes in these proxies over time indicate hedging activity.
They alternately regress these risk proxies on quarterly event time variables without con‐
trolling for any other factors.
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Size
Hedging operations can benefit from economies of scale, especially if
initial costs are large (Booth, Smith, and Stolz, 1984; Hoyt, 1989). Nance,
Smith, and Smithson (1993) and Mian (1996) are among the researchers
finding empirical support for a positive relation between firm size and
hedging via derivatives. Alternatively, Cummins, Phillips, and Smith
(1997) state that the larger, more diversified insurers may have relatively
lower needs for derivatives hedging. However, their empirical results
support a positive relation between size and derivatives usage for samples
of P‐C and L‐H insurers. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) also observe a positive
relation for a L‐H insurer sample.
Mayers and Smith (1990) posit that larger insurers can have relatively
lower needs for reinsurance hedging because of real‐services efficiencies
in underwriting and claims and lower bankruptcy costs, for which size can
serve as a proxy. Their empirical results for a sample of P‐C insurers show
a negative relation between reinsurance activity and size. Cole and
McCullough (2006) regard size as an inverse proxy for the costs of bank‐
ruptcy and they also observe a significantly negative relation with reinsur‐
ance purchases. Based upon the extant research, we expect a positive
relation between size and derivatives hedging, but a negative relation with
reinsurance hedging.

CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Stulz (1996) argues that hedging is a direct substitute for equity capital,
because hedging helps firms reserve more capital for investment opportu‐
nities by decreasing the probability of financial distress. Cummins and
Sommer (1996) provide both theoretical and empirical support for a posi‐
tive relation between capitalization and asset portfolio risk in the property–
casualty insurance industry. Baranoff and Sager (2002) report similar
empirical relations in the L‐H segment. However, after finding a positive
relation between derivatives usage and both risk‐based capital (RBC) ratio
and capital‐to‐asset ratio in some of their derivatives volume models,
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) speculate that firms that maintain a
higher RBC ratio are more risk averse and thus more likely to hedge using
derivatives. Considering the conflicting results in previous research, we do
not make a prediction for the capital adequacy results.
Both underinvestment risks and bankruptcy costs can encourage man‐
agers of riskier firms to purchase reinsurance (Mayers and Smith, 1990).
Applying A.M. Best ratings as a proxy for capital adequacy, they show the
expected negative relation with reinsurance activity for P‐C insurers.
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Stock Organizational Form
The managerial discretion hypothesis suggests that managers of stock
firms tend to engage in more complex and risky business activities (Mayers
and Smith, 1988) and are more likely to use complex financial instruments
such as derivatives (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). The managerial risk aversion
hypothesis (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 2001) predicts that managers of
mutual firms are more likely to be risk averse because of organizational
specific‐capital and difficulty in diversifying personal wealth and, there‐
fore, more likely to reduce risk by hedging via derivatives. In light of these
conflicting hypotheses, we cannot predict the impact of organizational
form on derivatives hedging.
We consider reinsurance a more familiar, less complex hedging tool
than derivatives to managers of insurers. Cole and McCullough (2006) note
that mutual managers, who have less access to capital markets in the event
of catastrophic loss, should be more likely to reinsure. For these reasons,
we expect mutual insurers to use reinsurance to a greater extent than stock
insurers.

Group Affiliation
Cummins and Sommer (1996) state that managers of an insurance
group can hedge risk by spreading it through separate insurance firms that
make up the group, which gives them the freedom to allow individual
firms to go bankrupt in the event of financial distress. Group affiliation
therefore can serve as a form of hedging, an expectation supported by
evidence from both the P‐C and L‐H insurance industries (Cummins and
Sommer, 1996; Baranoff and Sager, 2002). By this line of reasoning, group
affiliation should decrease managers’ use of derivatives and reinsurance.
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) provide evidence of this inverse
relation for the derivatives activity of P‐C insurers and mixed evidence for
L‐H insurers. They posit that the greater volatility of P‐C insurance markets
can make the separation of assets among affiliated firms more important
to managers of P‐C insurers than to those of L‐H insurers.
Alternatively, Mayers and Smith (1990) suggest that group‐affiliated
insurers should use relatively more reinsurance than nonaffiliated insurers
because of the ability to shift profits and reduce taxes between group
members via reinsurance transactions. Both Mayers and Smith (1990) and
Cole and McCullough (2006) provide supporting empirical evidence from
the P‐C insurance market.
Considering the conflicting results in previous research, we do not
make a prediction of the relation of group affiliation with derivatives or
reinsurance activity for our sample.
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Tax Shields
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that, because of the convex tax schedule,
a firm can decrease expected tax liabilities by hedging to reduce the
volatility of income flow. Managers also are likely to hedge risks to exploit
tax shields such as tax credits and loss carry‐forwards, especially if
expected future income streams are highly volatile. Nance, Smith, and
Smithson (1993) generate empirical evidence for a positive relation
between tax credits and corporate hedging. We consequently expect a
positive relation between tax shields available to insurers and the use of
hedging devices, including derivatives and reinsurance.
To investigate tax‐induced hedging, we use two tax shield proxies that
were developed by Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (CPS) (2001) because
data on tax credits and tax‐loss carry‐forwards are not publicly available.
The first is a binary variable equal to one if no taxes were paid, which could
be indicative of tax‐loss carry‐forwards. CPS reason that insurers hedge to
produce positive taxable income to take advantage of unused tax‐loss
carry‐forwards. The second is a binary variable for which a value of one
indicates that the insurer is in the alternative minimum tax range, which
reflects maximum income tax convexity. If it falls in this range, the insurer
should have a tax incentive to hedge to decrease income volatility.

Growth Opportunities
The theoretical model of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) indicates
that potential underinvestment problems can induce managers with
greater growth opportunities to hedge more. While Nance, Smith, and
Smithson (1993), Mian (1996), and Schrand and Unal (1998) report empir‐
ical evidence of a relation between growth opportunities and corporate
hedging, Tufano’s (1996) evidence from the gold mining industry indicates
no such relation. Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) use several growth
opportunity proxies to test for potential underinvestment effects on deriv‐
atives usage by insurers, but find no empirical relation.
Mayers and Smith (1987) argue that leveraged firms can mitigate
underinvestment problems by purchasing corporate insurance. Their
subsequent study of reinsurance purchases by insurers provides no direct
evidence of such effects, however. Given the conflicting empirical evidence
concerning potential underinvestment effects on hedging, the expected
effect on either derivatives or reinsurance activity is necessarily
ambiguous.
To account for growth opportunities, we initially use the one‐year
growth rate in premiums. While book‐to‐market ratios often are used as
proxies for growth opportunities, these can be applied only for firms with

RISK ALLOCATION ACROSS THE ENTERPRISE

81

publicly‐traded equity. Our measure can be applied to all insurers in our
sample, which includes a large number of privately‐held companies. For
robustness purposes, we subsequently test the one‐year asset growth rate
for both P‐C and L‐H insurers. For L‐H insurers, we also test the ratio of
net premiums from reinvestment of policyholders’ dividends and coupons
for existing policies, which was suggested by Cummins, Phillips, and
Smith (2001).

Cash Flow Volatility
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) state that high variation in internal
cash flows causes managers to bypass profitable projects when external
financing is costly. Hedging can be used to increase the firm’s value by
mitigating cash flow volatility. Minton and Schrand (1999) examine a broad
cross‐section of nonfinancial firms and find that cash flow volatility is
positively related to a firm’s cost of external capital and also reduces
investment in potential growth projects by the firm. They therefore suggest
that existing cash flow volatility is an important factor in managers’ risk
management decisions, but state that the impact will vary depending upon
the benefits of future reductions in volatility, the costs of hedging, and
managers’ preferences regarding future levels of volatility.
Minton and Schrand (1999) further note that hedging costs are low for
firms in which well‐developed derivatives markets exist, such as oil and
gas or agriculture. Extending their conjecture to the insurance industry, we
argue that derivatives markets are highly developed for hedging financial
risk, such as the interest‐rate, exchange‐rate, and stock market risks
accepted by insurers. While hedging these risks is directly relevant to the
investment portfolios of both P‐C and L‐H segments of the industry,
differences may occur when it comes to underwriting portfolios. We expect
these well‐developed derivatives markets to apply particularly to life
insurance and annuity contracts underwritten by life insurers. In contrast,
derivatives markets for P‐C underwriting risks are not nearly as well‐
established and contracts are quite costly (see, e.g., Froot, 1999).
A strong positive relation between cash flow volatility and hedging
activities would suggest that hedging activities are conducted to reduce
total firm risk whereas a weak or no relation would be consistent with risk
allocation. Our measure of cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of
unhedged cash flow during the previous five years, divided by the mean
of admitted assets. To estimate unhedged cash flow, we make adjustments
to account for income related to both derivatives and reinsurance.
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Liquidity
Doherty (1985) suggests that some managers prefer liquid assets rather
than post‐loss instruments to finance losses because recovery is more rapid
and allows immediate reinvestment. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)
state that if external costs of funds are more expensive than internally
generated funds, then liquidity is an alternative for funding investments
after financial shocks. To the extent that liquidity problems signal poor
management practices and even threaten the firm’s solvency, Doherty
(2000) demonstrates that managers will use liquidity as a smoothing mech‐
anism to avoid financial distress costs. Because of this possible substitution
effect, we expect firm liquidity to be negatively related to hedging with
either derivatives or reinsurance. As our proxy for liquidity we use the
quick ratio, i.e., cash and short‐term investments divided by admitted
assets. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) show that this measure is less
prone to asymmetric information problems than are other liquidity
estimates.

Loss Development
We include a loss development variable in the reinsurance equation
for P‐C insurers to control for possible under‐ or over‐reserving. Cole and
McCullough (2006) find that insurers that have positive loss development
(under‐reserve) use more reinsurance, and we expect such a relation for
our sample.7

Line-of-business Concentration and Geographic
Concentration
The real services hypothesis of Mayers and Smith (1990) implies that
managers of insurers that are more concentrated by line of business or
geography have a comparative advantage in writing policies and therefore
a larger propensity for risk taking. Their empirical evidence from the P‐C
insurance industry reveals that both line‐of‐business and geographic con‐
centration negatively affect the demand for reinsurance. Cole and
McCullough (2006) observe similar relations. We consequently expect a
negative relation between these two forms of underwriting concentration
and reinsurance activity.
7

We do not include this variable in our tests of L‐H insurers. Manipulation of estimated
losses and reserves is less likely because well‐established actuarial tables are thought to
limit managerial discretion (Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 1999).
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Asset-Liability Structure
Cummins, Philips, and Smith (CPS) (2001) note that mismatches of
asset and liability duration expose insurers to interest‐rate risk, but these
can be hedged with derivatives. They develop an estimate for the duration
gap between insurer assets and liabilities, but do not find any relation with
hedging activity. They also include proxies for the relative holdings of
several classes of assets and liabilities that are more susceptible to duration
mismatching, whether intended or unintended, by managers. We test the
asset holding and liability issuance variables that CPS find to be significant.
For P‐C insurers, we include both stock and real estate holdings as
percentages of admitted assets. On the liability side, we follow CPS in
applying binary variables for foreign liabilities and products liabilities. We
also include commercial long‐tailed liability reserves as a percent of total
reserves. For L‐H insurers, we use stock, private bond, and collateralized
mortgage obligations (CMOs) as percentages of admitted assets. On the
liability side, we include variables for both individual life and annuity
reserves and guaranteed investment contract (GIC) reserves as a percent‐
age of total reserves. While CPS expect these measures to be positively
related to derivatives hedging, their coefficients are consistently positive
only for P‐C insurers’ holdings of stocks and L‐H insurers’ private CMO
holdings and GIC reserves.

Product Differences
We expect hedging activity to be different between L‐H insurers and
P‐C insurers. Some life insurer products directly encompass both invest‐
ment and underwriting risks, while P‐C products generally impound
underwriting risk. For example, L‐H insurer products, such as permanent
life, universal life, annuities, and guaranteed investment contracts,
impound substantial investment components. Therefore, L‐H insurers
should be relatively more active in hedging underwriting‐related invest‐
ment risk via derivatives. In addition, the underwriting risks faced by P‐C
insurers because of potentially catastrophic losses such as hurricanes,
tornados, earthquakes, and wildfire should produce relatively greater
reinsurance activity because of contracts designed to hedge these
exposures. Because of these product differences, we test samples of P‐C
and L‐H insurers separately.

RESEARCH DESIGN
We test for allocation of risk across the insurance enterprise by devel‐
oping a simultaneous equations model that assesses both the hedging of
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investment risk with derivatives and the hedging of underwriting risk with
reinsurance.

Data
We obtain our data from the National Association of Insurance Com‐
missioners (NAIC) InfoPro database, which contains annual financial
statements for virtually all firms licensed to sell insurance in the U.S. The
NAIC began publishing data for insurer activity in derivatives in 2001, and
our sample includes data derived from the Schedule DB database for years
2001 through 2008. The initial sample consisted of 12,008 life‐health (L‐H)
firm‐year observations and 15,264 property‐casualty (P‐C) firm‐year obser‐
vations. We omit insurers with zero or negative admitted assets, premiums
written, or surplus. The final sample consists of 8,384 firm‐year observa‐
tions for L‐H insurers and 12,880 for P‐C insurers for the period from 2001
through 2008. This screening eliminated many very small firms, none of
which used derivatives, and account for only about 2.1% of industry assets.
The NAIC InfoPro dataset does not provide consolidated financial
data for L‐H insurance groups, and Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997)
find that group‐level analysis of the derivatives participation decision
provides no more information than company‐level analysis, so we analyze
data for individual firms rather than groups.

Model
In their regression model, Schrand and Unal (1998) regress their
measure of homogeneous risk (interest rate risk) on their measure of core‐
business risk (credit risk) without applying any control variables. Our data
allow us to implement a multivariate, simultaneous‐equations system in
which the dependent variable in the first equation is our measure for
hedging homogeneous risk (derivatives) and the dependent variable in the
second equation is our measure for hedging core‐business risk (reinsur‐
ance activity). In contrast to Schrand and Unal, we are able to include
control variables that researchers have found to be important in determin‐
ing derivatives and reinsurance activity. If the use of derivatives and
reinsurance is jointly determined, as would be expected in a risk allocation
approach, then a simultaneous‐equations model should detect a relation
between these two hedging activities. In contrast, a single‐equation model
will be mis‐specified.
Our model represents a refined presentation of the simultaneous‐
equations approach first developed by Zhang (2005) for both P‐C and L‐H
insurers. We note that Cummins and Song (2008) later proposed a similar
method for P‐C insurers. They present a mean‐variance efficiency optimi‐
zation model, which is dependent upon corporate insurers acting as entities
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that are risk averse and maximize utility. Our approach contrasts with that
of Cummins and Song because it is firmly rooted in the previously devel‐
oped literature on financial risk allocation and is not dependent upon
corporate entity risk aversion and/or utility functions. Our model follows:
Simultaneous equations for P‐C insurers:
IR

IR

IR

DERIV it = α + β 0 REINS i ,t + β 1 SIZE i ,t + β 2 CAPADEQ i ,t +

IR
IR
IR
IR
β 3 STOCK i ,t + β 4 GROUP i ,t + β 5 TAXA i ,t + β 6 TAXB i ,t +
IR
IR
IR
IR
β 7 GROWTH i ,t + β 8 VOLAT i ,t + β 9 LIQUID i ,t + β 10 %STK i ,t
IR
IR
IR
β 11 %RE i ,t + β 12 FORLIAB i ,t + β 13 %COMMLT i ,t +
IR
IR
%β 14 PRODLIAB + ε i ,t

UR

REINS it = α 0

UR

(1)

+

UR

+ β 0 DERIV i ,t + β 1 SIZE i ,t +

(2)

UR
UR
UR
UR
β 2 CAPADEQ i ,t + β 3 STOCK i ,t + β 4 GROUP i ,t + β 5 TAXA i ,t +
UR
UR
UR
UR
β 6 TAXB i ,t + β 7 GROWTH i ,t + β 8 VOLAT it + β 9 LIQUID i ,t +
UR
UR
UR
UR
β 10 LOSSDEV + β 11 LOD it + β 12 GEOG + ε i ,t

Simultaneous equations for L‐H insurers:
IR

IR

IR

DERIV it = α + β 0 REINS i ,t + β 1 SIZE i ,t + β 2 CAPADEQ i ,t +

IR
IR
IR
IR
β 3 STOCK i ,t + β 4 GROUP i ,t + β 5 TAXA i ,t + β 6 TAXB i ,t +
IR
IR
IR
IR
β 7 GROWTH i ,t + β 8 VOLAT i ,t + β 9 LIQUID i ,t + β 10 %STK i ,t
IR
IR
IR
β 11 %PRIVBOND i ,t + β 12 PRIVCMO i ,t + β 13 INDL&A i ,t +
IR
IR
β 14 %GIC i ,t + ε i ,t

UR

REINS it = α 0

UR

UR

(3)

+

UR

+ β 0 DERIV i ,t + β 1 SIZE i ,t + β 2 CAPADEQ i ,t +

(4)

UR
UR
UR
UR
β 3 STOCK i ,t + β 4 GROUP i ,t + β 5 TAXA i ,t + β 6 TAXB i ,t +
UR
UR
UR
UR
β 7 GROWTH i ,t + β 8 VOLAT i ,t + β 9 LIQUID i ,t + β 10 LOB it +
UR
UR
β 11 GEOG + ε i ,t

where IR and UR superscripts indicate investment risk and underwriting
risk, respectively. Definitions of independent variables and their expected
signs are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Expected Signs
Expected signs
Variable

DERIV
L/H

P/C

REINS
L/H

Definition

P/C

DERIV

n/a

+/–

Ratio of derivatives year‐end position held (or
alternatively derivatives whole‐year transaction
vol.) to admitted assets

REINS

+/–

n/a

Ratio of reinsurance ceded to reinsurers by the
insurer to direct premiums written plus reinsurance
assumed

SIZE

+

+

CAPADEQ

+/–

STOCK

+/–

GROUP

+/–

–

–
+/–

–

Natural logarithm of admitted assets
Ratio of total adjusted capital to the authorized
control level of risk‐based capital, as specified by
the NAIC

–
+/–

Organizational form dummy
(1 if stock insurer and 0 otherwise)
Group affiliation dummy (1 if insurer is affiliated
with a group of insurers and 0 otherwise)

TAXA

+

+

+

+

Tax shield dummy
(1 if no federal income tax paid or 0 otherwise)

TAXB

+

+

+

+

Tax shield dummy (1 if federal taxes incurred are
positive while taxable net income is non‐positive
and the ratio of federal income tax incurred to
pre‐tax income is less than 25%; 0 otherwise)

GROWTH
VOLAT

LIQUID

+/–
+

+/–

+/–

+

–

–

–

One‐year premium growth rate

+/–

–
+

Ratio of the standard deviation of unhedged cash
flow during the previous five years to the mean of
admitted assets during the previous five years
Ratio of cash and short‐term investments to
admitted assets

LOSSDEV

n/a

n/a

n/a

LOB

n/a

n/a

–

–

Ratio of two‐year loss development to surplus
Herfindahl index for line‐of‐business concentration

GEOG

n/a

n/a

–

–

Herfindahl index for the geographic concentration

Asset‐Liability Structure Variables
STK

+

RE

n/a

PRIVBOND

+

+

n/a

n/a Ratio of stock holdings to admitted assets

+

n/a

n/a Ratio of real estate holdings to admitted assets

n/a

n/a

n/a Ratio of private placement bond holdings to
admitted assets
Table continues
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Table 1. continued
PRIVCMO

+

n/a

n/a

n/a Ratio of private placement CMO holdings to
admitted assets

FORLIAB

n/a

+

n/a

n/a Foreign liability dummy (1 if the insurer has liabil‐
ities denominated in foreign currencies or 0 other‐
wise)

COMMLT

n/a

+

n/a

n/a Ratio of commercial long‐tailed line (workers comp,
commercial auto liability and other liability)
reserves to total reserves

PRODLIAB

n/a

+

n/a

n/a Ratio of product liability reserves to total reserves

INDL&A

+

n/a

n/a

n/a Ratio of individual life & annuity reserves to total
reserves

GIC

+

n/a

n/a

n/a Ratio of GIC reserves to total reserves

We alternately use two measures for derivatives activity (DERIV).
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997, 2001) suggest that derivatives trans‐
action volumes reported for the entire year can better reflect hedging
activity compared to year‐end positions because some insurers close posi‐
tions prior to year end for window‐dressing purposes. Using only year‐end
data also may eliminate some insurers that hedge during the year, but have
no year‐end positions. We consequently use both year‐end positions and
transactions volume for the entire year to estimate derivatives activity. We
follow Mayers and Smith (1990) in applying reinsurance ceded to reinsur‐
ers divided by direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed as our
measure for reinsurance hedging activity.

Estimation Method
To estimate our simultaneous equations model, we use a two‐step
approach following Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003). For the derivatives
equation (1) applied to our P‐C insurer sample, we first regress our rein‐
surance activity proxy on all exogenous variables in the reduced form of
the reinsurance equation (2), using a random effects model, and get the
predicted value of reinsurance usage, ˆ
. Next, we insert ˆ
into
the modified structural form of the derivatives equation (1), and estimate
using a Tobit random effects model. For the reinsurance equation (2), we
first regress our derivatives activity proxy on all exogenous variables in the
reduced form of the derivatives equation (1), and get the predicted value
ˆ
of derivatives usage,
, using a Tobit random effects model.8 We next
ˆ
insert
into the modified structural form of reinsurance equation
(2) and estimate using a random effects model. Because a Tobit model is
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used to estimate the coefficients for the derivatives equation (1), we also
report the marginal effects. For the L‐H sample, we follow the same
method, simply substituting equations (3) and (4) for equations (1) and (2)
in the prior description.
We further analyze the potential impacts of multicollinearity and
heteroscedasticity on the estimates. To detect any multicollinearity prob‐
lems, we generate variance inflation factors (VIFs). We use the Lagrange
multiplier test to check for heteroscedasticity in the Tobit model (derivative
equations 1 and 3), and use the GLS estimator to mitigate any heterosce‐
dasticity problems in reinsurance equations 2 and 4, which are not limited
dependent variable models.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary statistics for our main test variables are shown in Table 2.
L‐H insurers are more active in derivatives hedging than P‐C insurers. For
example, L‐H insurers held year‐end derivatives positions with nominal
values of 27% of admitted assets, compared to only 9% for P‐C insurers. A
possible explanation is that L‐H insurers are exposed to more financial
market risk because they hold larger proportions of long‐term assets to
match their long‐term liabilities for mortality and morbidity exposures.
Also, as mentioned previously, L‐H insurers face investment risks not only
in their investment operations, but also in their underwriting operations
due to the nature of some interest‐sensitive L‐H insurance products
(Raturi, 2005).
On the other hand, P‐C insurers hold reinsurance positions more than
double those of L‐H insurers relative to direct premiums written. This
result is consistent with that of Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) and
suggests that P‐C insurers are more willing to cede underwriting risk,
probably because of the volatility of shorter term, catastrophic losses. In
addition, we note that users of derivatives cede less than non‐users.
Approximately 80% of P‐C insurers and 90% of L‐H insurers are stock
firms. Insurers that are members of insurance groups tend to use relatively
more derivatives whether they are predominantly P‐C or L‐H insurers.
8

Greene (2004) discusses problems when using fixed effects estimation for Tobit panel data
models. Even if fixed effects estimation is applied in such models, Greene argues, research‐
ers cannot determine whether fixed or random effects estimation is more appropriate. In
essence, a Hausman test cannot be devised because of the incidental parameters problem.
Also, fixed effects are not suitable for estimating variables with insufficient within‐firm vari‐
ation, which is the case for some of our binary independent variables.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: For Users and Non‐Users of Derivatives
P‐C Insurers

L‐H Insurers

Mean

Mean

Variable

Users

Non‐users

Users

Non‐users

Derivative year‐end position

0.089

—

0.271

—

Derivative whole‐year volume

0.247

—

0.879

—

Reinsurance

0.29

0.38

0.14

0.16

20.94

18.01

21.32

17.35

Stock Form

0.79

0.81

0.88

0.95

Group affiliation

0.83

0.74

0.89

0.79

Size

Total year‐firm observations

12,880

8,384

Notes: The time period is from 2001 through 2008. The variables are described in Table 1.

Regression Results
Although not fully reported here, correlation coefficients for our test
variables never exceed 0.38 and variance inflation factors are uniformly
low. We conclude that collinearity is highly unlikely to be a problem with
our data.
Table 3 reports simultaneous regression results for P‐C insurers in our
sample, with activity in derivatives and reinsurance serving as the depen‐
dent variables in panels A and B, respectively. As shown in panel A, we
first apply the derivatives proxy based upon year‐end position and then
the proxy using whole‐year volume. We alternately use these two estimates
of derivatives activity in two specifications of the reinsurance model.
The derivatives model results in panel A indicate that the reinsurance
coefficient is negative and significant in all four specifications. The reinsur‐
ance model results in panel B also indicate a negative relation with deriv‐
atives activity for both specifications, but only significant at the 10% level
when the whole‐year derivatives proxy is used. Overall, our results are
consistent with the risk allocation expectations of Schrand and Unal
(1998). In other words, insurers that hedge relatively more homogeneous
(investment) risk using derivatives simultaneously hedge less of their core‐
business (underwriting) risk, via reinsurance. The results suggest that U.S.
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Table 3. Estimation of Simultaneous Equations Models
for Property‐Casualty Insurers
Panel A: Derivatives Model
Dependent variable is censored. P‐values are in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported
in the shaded areas.
Derivatives model
Year‐end position
Reinsurance
Size

–4.966

–0.064

–9.386

–0.261

(0.055)*

(0.021)**

(0.008)***

(0.002)***

0.081
(0.032)**

Capital adequacy

0.029
(0.141)

Stock form
Group affiliation

TaxB

Volatility
Liquidity
Stock holdings
Real estate holdings

0.277

(0.189)

(0.074)*

<0.001
(0.041)**

0.075

(0.028)**

0.004

–0.102

–0.001

(0.471)

(0.019)**

0.387

0.009

1.219

(0.002)***

(0.076)*

0.054
(0.039)**

–0.103

<–0.001

–0.073

<–0.001

(0.67)

(0.59)

(0.81)

(0.62)

0.107

0.004

0.329

(0.025)**

(0.027)**

0.023
(0.072)*

0.512

0.007

0.801

0.037

0.387

0.009

1.219

0.054

0.610

0.011

1.200

0.011

(0.649)

(0.537)

(0.182)

(0.478)

–0.589

–0.007

–1.500

–0.077

(0.032)**

(0.057)*

(0.035)**

(0.002)***

0.120

0.005

1.07

(0.285)

(0.107)

(0.167)

(0.043)**

–0.073

–1.655

–0.078

–3.12

(<0.001)***

(0.245)

–0.011

–0.022

<0.001

(0.453)

(0.111)

–0.265
(0.118)

(0.004)***

Commercial long‐tail reserves

–0.044

<0.001

0.336

(0.639)

(0.889)

(0.567)

–0.133

–0.006

(0.277)

(0.171)

0.472

0.033

(0.736)

Foreign liabilities

Adjusted R2

0.008

(0.226)

(0.072)*

(0.086)*

Product liability reserves

0.026
(0.019)**

0.098

(0.041)**
Growth opportunities

0.001

(0.186)
(0.045)**
TaxA

Whole‐year volume

0.456
(0348)

0.025
(0.033)**
0.009
(0.088)*

0.543
Table continues
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Table 3. continued
Panel B: Reinsurance Model
P‐values are in parentheses.
Reinsurance mode
Deriv. year‐end position

–0.838
(0.145)

Deriv. whole‐year volume

–1.238
(0.089)*

Size
Capital adequacy

–0.109

–0.083

(0.035)**

(0.069)*

0.005
(0.012)**

Stock form
Group affiliation

TaxB
Growth opportunities
Volatility
Liquidity
Loss development
LOB concentration
Geographic concentration

Adjusted R2

(0.213)

<–0.001

–0.002

(0.67)

(0.53)

0.035
(0.011)**

TaxA

<0.001

1.238
(0.052)*

0.045

0.031

(0.572)

(0.653)

0.025

0.096

(0.428)

(0.365)

0.089

0.040

(0.053)*

(0.084)*

0.070

0.056

(0.473)

(0.401)

–0.205

–0.107

(0.091)*

(0.056)*

0.098

0.041

(0.932)

(0.944)

0.037

0.027

(0.501)

(0.432)

–0.017

–0.047

(0.398)

(0.426)

0.194

0.251

Notes: The time period is from 2001 through 2008. The vari‐
ables are described in Table 1. The t‐statistics are in parenthe‐
ses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is
denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.
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P‐C insurer managers actively allocate risk across the enterprise rather than
simply endeavoring to reduce total risk.
Among the control variables, size is consistently positive and generally
significant in the derivatives models, which supports the concepts of
substantial initial costs and economies of scale in derivatives hedging
operations. For the reinsurance models, we find size to be significantly,
negatively related to reinsurance activity. This finding is consistent with
arguments for real‐services efficiencies and nontrivial bankruptcy costs, as
well as extant empirical results. In the derivatives and reinsurance models,
we observe a significantly positive capital adequacy coefficient in three of
six specifications, but the average magnitude of this effect is small. These
results do not support the argument that capital is a substitute for hedging.
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) find similar results and contend that
a higher risk‐based‐capital (RBC) ratio may indicate a more risk averse firm
that is more likely to hedge risks.
The results for the stock organizational form coefficients are mixed and
generally of minor magnitude, which is reflective of the conflicting theories
and empirical results in the prior literature. As stated previously,
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (2001) consider whole‐year derivatives vol‐
ume to better reflect an insurer’s derivative usage because the year‐end
figure is likely to reflect “window dressing” actions. In cases where results
are significant in the opposite directions for year‐end and whole‐year, such
as the stock organizational form results for P‐C insurers, we lean toward
the whole‐year results, which show a negative relation between stock form
and derivatives use. This indicates that mutual insurers are more likely to
use derivatives than stock insurers, which supports the managerial risk
aversion hypothesis. In the reinsurance regression, the stock form variable
is negative, in agreement with the Cole and McCullough (2006) expecta‐
tion, but not significant. Cole and McCullough (2006) found mixed regres‐
sion results for the stock form variable, suggesting no clear support for a
relation between stock form and reinsurance usage.
The group affiliation variable is uniformly and significantly positive
in both the derivatives and reinsurance models, which is not consistent
with the argument that group affiliation serves as a form of hedging that
is a substitute for derivatives and reinsurance usage. The positive relation
between group affiliation and reinsurance is consistent with the Mayers
and Smith (1990) contention that affiliation may lead to more reinsurance
usage as a way to shift profits among group members to reduce taxes.
While the first tax shield variable, TAXA, is not significant in either
the derivatives or reinsurance models, the second variable, TAXB, is
significantly positive in the derivatives model, as expected. This result
implies that P‐C insurers are using derivatives to reduce income volatility
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and thereby reduce taxes. Our results reveal a uniformly and significantly
positive relation between our premium growth proxy for growth oppor‐
tunities and hedging via derivatives and a marginally significant and
positive relation between premium growth and reinsurance hedging.
These results are supportive of the preponderance of theory, although
prior empirical evidence has been scant. We therefore also test an alter‐
native proxy—i.e., asset growth—and find the resulting coefficients to
generally be quite small and insignificant. We conclude that the results
specific to growth variables in our sample are sensitive to the choice of
proxy.
The cash flow volatility coefficients for P‐C insurers, while reflecting
the expected positive sign for both the derivatives and reinsurance models,
are not significant in either. Coefficients for liquidity ratios are significantly
negative, as expected, in both the derivatives and reinsurance models,
supporting the argument that liquidity serves as a substitute form of
hedging. While the asset and liability structure variables provide some
explanatory power for derivatives activity in individual specifications, we
do not observe consistently significant relations across all the specifications
for the P‐C insurer sample.
Our regression results for the L‐H insurer sample are provided in Table
4. Although we consistently find the expected negative relation between
derivatives and reinsurance, this relation is significant in only one specifi‐
cation. This result does not surprise us because the inclusion of elements
of homogeneous investment risk in L‐H products means that derivatives
can be used to hedge core‐business (underwriting) operations, too. We find
that size positively affects derivatives hedging on a consistent basis,
although this variable is not always significant. As with P‐C insurers, size
is significantly and negatively related to reinsurance hedging by L‐H
insurers, which is supportive of real‐services efficiencies and/or substantial
costs of bankruptcy arguments.
Our capital adequacy measures are negatively related to derivatives
hedging, but not significant. Similar to results for the P‐C insurer sample,
a positive relation between capital adequacy and reinsurance activity is
observed, but with marginal significance. We find a negative relation
between group affiliation and derivatives activity for all of our specifica‐
tions, but only one is marginally significant, so we generally do not find
support for the argument that group affiliation can serve as an alternative
to hedging. The group affiliation coefficients are significantly positive
for both forms of the reinsurance models, however. This evidence is
consistent with previous work finding that group affiliated insurers use
more reinsurance.
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Table 4. Estimation of Simultaneous Equations Models
for Life‐Health Insurers
Panel A: Derivatives Model
Dependent variable is censored. P‐values are in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported
in the shaded areas.
Derivatives model
Year‐end position
Reinsurance
Size
Capital adequacy
Stock form
Group affiliation
TaxA
TaxB

–3.899

–0.059

–6.377

–0.327

(0.431)

(0.636)

(0.179)

(0.033)**

0.278

0.009

0.669

(0.256)

(0.755)

Volitility
Liquidity
Stock holdings

Private CMO holdings
Individual L‐A reserves
GIC reserves

Adjusted R2

(<0.001)***

–0.078

–0.008

(0.329)

(0.370)

(0.114)

–0.216

–0.023

0.317

0.029

(0.763)

(0.618)

(0.954)

(0.570)

–0.230

–0.004

–1.101

–0.023

(0.451)

(0.766)

(0.931)

(0.088)*

–1.433

–0.032

–1.029

–0.065

(0.835)

(0.387)

(0.165)

(0.103)

0.349

<0.001

–0.689

–0.021

–0.012

(0.806)
<–0.001

(0.051)*

(0.114)

–0.112

–0.009

(0.286)

(0.744)

(0.482)

(0.377)

0.037

<0.001

–0.335

–0.009

(0.875)

(0.729)

(0.478)

(0.542)

0.454

0.007

2.301

(0.696)

(0.710)

(0.983)

–0.488
(0.922)

Private bond holdings

<–0.001

0.078

(0.007)***

(0.244)

–0.023

(0.978)
Growth opportunities

Whole‐year volume

<–0.001
(0.914)

1.849
(0.161)

0.898

0.012

3.387

(0.953)

(0.762)

(0.923)

0.109
(0.036)**
0.231
(0.042)**
0.14
(0.020)**

0.234

0.002

3.281

0.153

(0.202)

(0.670)

(0.089)*

(0.114)

0.138

<0.001

0.578

0.011

(0.354)

(0.218)

(0.143)

(0.055)*

0.378

<0.001

0.104

<0.001

(0.520)

(0.187)

(0.183)

(0.157)

0.154

0.326
Table continues
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Table 4. continued
Panel B: Reinsurance Model
P‐values are in parentheses.
Reinsurance model
Derivative year‐end position

–0.095
(0.129)

Derivative whole‐year volume

–0.021
(0.150)

Size

–0.033

–0.021

(0.003)***

(0.029)**

Capital adequacy

<0.001

Stock form
Group affiliation

(0.091)*

(0.152)

0.035

0.009

(0.657)

(0.413)

0.081

0.029

(0.041)**
TaxA
TaxB

(0.024)**

0.005

<0.001

(0.822)

(0.943)

0.032

0.004

(0.195)
Growth opportunities

0.003

<–0.001

(0.310)
<–0.001

(0.294)

(0.309)

Volatility

0.064

0.033

Liquidity

–0.011

<–0.001

(0.473)

(–0.08)

LOB concentration

–0.086

–0.021

(0.149)

(0.193)

Geographic concentration

–0.108

–0.067

(0.139)

(0.009)***
Adjusted R2

0.321

(0.079)*

(<0.001)***
0.398

Notes: The time period is from 2001 through 2008. The variables are
described in Table 1. The t‐statistics are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and
* respectively.
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While we do not find cash flow volatility to be significantly related to
derivatives hedging, it is positive and marginally significant in one of the
reinsurance specifications. Our other strong finding is a significantly
negative relation between geographic concentration and hedging via rein‐
surance, which is consistent with prior research.
We find no other independent variables that are consistently signifi‐
cant in the derivatives models. Factors such as group affiliation, tax shields,
growth opportunities, and liquidity were consistently significant explana‐
tory factors for derivatives activity among our sample of P‐C insurers, but
not for our L‐H insurers. For robustness purposes, we again test an alter‐
native growth proxy, asset growth, and find no significant relation. We also
test a third growth proxy, the ratio of new premiums from the reinvestment
of policyholders’ dividends and coupons, but generally do not find signif‐
icant relations.
Our results suggest that the different nature of underwriting operations
for L‐H insurers substantially mitigates the many strong relations that we
observe for P‐C insurers with respect to derivatives activity. The compara‐
tive results are somewhat more consistent between these two sectors of the
insurance industry in terms of explaining reinsurance hedging, however.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Risk traditionally has been managed in silos with corporate risk
managers focusing on insurable operational losses while the treasury
department uses derivatives to reduce investment risks, such as interest
rate, credit, market, and foreign exchange risk. Recent theory and industry
practice have evolved to address coordination and strategic allocation of
all firm risks. The convergence of financial risk management and insur‐
ance‐related risk management provides a broader platform for firms to
more effectively allocate and finance their risks. Scant empirical research
exists in this area, however, despite the currently prevalent discussion of
enterprise risk management in risk management and insurance trade
journals. A major problem has been the paucity of publicly available data
for assessing corporate hedging practices.
Using data from the insurance industry, we are able to directly inves‐
tigate hedging proxies to assess the allocation of risk across the firm. We
find some evidence that insurers are hedging their homogeneous, invest‐
ment risks while simultaneously accepting more core‐business, underwrit‐
ing risk. We also find evidence that differences in the underwriting risks
facing P‐C and L‐H insurers lead to different strategies for allocating risk.
Although Stulz (1996), Schrand and Unal (1998), and others provide a
starting point for the development of theory and empirical research related
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to risk allocation, much work remains as researchers explore this topic
within the broad framework of enterprise risk management. Research into
whether managers can improve firm value by strategically allocating risk
should have great promise. Alignment of underwriting risk profiles with
risk allocation strategies also begs further examination. In light of the
critical failures of risk management during the credit crisis of 2008 and
2009, the deployment of capital based upon risk should also be of great
interest to researchers. Extensive and detailed financial data from the
insurance industry should prove to be very important in examining these
issues in the future.
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